On This Page7 sections
Key Takeaways
- Check where and when the extension was installed. On October 29, 2026, Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace served tampered copies of
anthropic.claude-codeversions2.1.312and2.1.313for macOS and Windows. The exposure window was approximately 09:27–20:35 UTC. Cursor’s security notice - Up to 5,000 users may have received a malicious package. That figure counts potential recipients. Establishing whether the code ran or someone logged in requires evidence from the individual workstation. Cursor’s November 13 investigation
- Two groups need to act for different reasons. Developers who installed an affected build should check their machines. Customers whom Cursor notified about exposed API credentials should rotate the identified keys, even if they never installed Claude Code. Cursor’s incident report
How a read-only key led to a software supply chain attack
The incident began with a key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks. It granted read-only access to a storage bucket containing historical coding-agent traces, mostly from 2025. Some traces still contained working credentials. The storage permission prevented changes to the bucket, but anyone who copied a credential could use whatever permissions it carried elsewhere. Cursor’s investigation
According to Cursor, credentials in the exposed data led the attacker into internal services. A further stolen credential let the attacker place altered extension packages directly in the cache that served Cursor users. A developer could therefore select the familiar Claude Code listing and receive different software from someone downloading the same version through another channel. Cursor’s account of the marketplace compromise
That detail explains why the download channel matters. Cursor says Open VSX, its upstream registry, never hosted the malicious packages. Microsoft confirmed that neither its Visual Studio Marketplace nor the official Claude Code npm package distributed them. A developer who used only the npm CLI falls outside the reported extension exposure. A developer who also used Claude Code inside Cursor should check that installation separately. Microsoft Security Research’s analysis
Who was affected by the Cursor breach?
Cursor reported three figures with different denominators. They answer different questions and should never be added together. Cursor’s November 13 incident report
| Reported exposure | What the figure measures | What to check |
|---|---|---|
| Up to 5,000 users | People who requested specific cached extension builds and may have received a tampered copy | Workstation install and update history, package hashes, and evidence of execution |
| Fewer than 0.05% of users | Users whose historical coding-agent traces were exposed | Cursor’s direct notification about the affected traces |
| Fewer than 0.01% of customers | Customers whose API credentials were exposed | The specific keys Cursor identified to the team administrator and their usage logs |
Privacy Mode matters to the second row. Cursor says prompts and code from Privacy Mode sessions were outside the exposed trace data. A developer could still have downloaded an affected extension while using Privacy Mode. Conversely, a team could have a credential to rotate without finding a single affected workstation. Cursor’s findings on Privacy Mode and customer notifications
How to check a Mac or Windows PC
Start with the installation record for October 29, 02:27–13:35 Pacific daylight time. Include automatic updates. The version displayed in Cursor today tells you what is installed now. An extension update during or after the incident can make that screen a poor record of what ran that day. Cursor published separate SHA-256 hashes for each affected version and platform, covering Apple silicon Macs (darwin-arm64) and 64-bit Windows (win32-x64). Cursor’s package hashes and exposure window
If the original .vsix package is available, calculate its hash without opening or installing it. Replace extension.vsix with the path to the retained download.
On macOS:
shasum -a 256 "extension.vsix"On Windows PowerShell:
Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 -LiteralPath 'extension.vsix'Compare the result with Cursor’s entry for that exact version and platform. A match identifies a malicious package and warrants checking whether it loaded. Hashing a fresh download only identifies the file retrieved today. If the original package is gone, use extension-installation records and endpoint logs. Cursor’s indicators of compromise
If the extension may have loaded, check for the attacker’s SSH public key. On a Mac, this read-only command searches the current user’s authorized keys for the published marker:
grep -nF 'svc-telemetry' "$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys"Compare any match with the full key fingerprint in Cursor’s notice. An empty result only describes that file for that user. On Windows, Cursor’s check covers both the user’s authorized keys and the system-wide administrators’ key file. The notice also identifies startup artifacts on both platforms. Cursor’s platform-specific checks
What the malicious extension could do
Microsoft found that the injected JavaScript ran as soon as the extension module loaded, before normal initialization. The developer did not need to send a Claude prompt. The code collected host details, attempted to establish SSH access, and wrote startup files that could survive removal of the extension. Its initial reporting code collected selected environment-variable names. That detail matters when investigating a suspected credential theft: seeing a variable name in the report does not establish that its secret value was transmitted. Microsoft’s technical analysis
A failed SSH connection also leaves an open question. Cursor reported that implementation errors and limited operating-system privileges prevented the backdoor from working on many machines. An unauthorized key or startup file could still remain. To determine whether anyone actually accessed a workstation, review SSH authentication records and subsequent process and file activity alongside the installation timestamp. Microsoft’s investigation and recovery guidance
What to do if a check finds a match
- Isolate a workstation that shows evidence of execution. On a managed device, involve the security team and preserve the original package, timestamps, and endpoint logs before cleanup. These records help distinguish a downloaded extension from a successful login. Microsoft’s response guidance
- Run the official cleanup for the affected operating system. Cursor instructs Mac users to run its script under the affected user account. Its Windows script requires an administrator PowerShell session. Both scripts report a nonzero exit status if artifacts remain. Cursor’s remediation scripts and instructions
- Recover credentials from a trusted device. Rotate credentials accessible from the affected workstation and revoke its sessions. Separately, if Cursor identified a specific API key to a team administrator, replace that key, revoke the old one, and review the provider’s usage history for unexpected activity. Cursor’s customer notification and rotation guidance
- Verify recovery after login or restart. Check that the unauthorized key and startup items stay gone. If the investigation cannot establish trust in the workstation, assess rebuilding it before returning it to development work. Microsoft’s recovery criteria
Conclusion
The most useful record in this incident is the one that connects a specific workstation, download channel, version, and time. Check October 29 installation history against Cursor’s published window. If a device matches, follow the endpoint checks through recovery. If the team received a credential notice, assign an owner to each named key and confirm that its old value has been revoked. Those two checks address the two distinct ways this incident reached developers. Cursor’s incident report · Official workstation checks
Continue Reading
More articles connected to the same themes, protocols, and tools.
Referenced Tools
Browse entries that are adjacent to the topics covered in this article.





